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I. INTRODUCTION
South Korea's economic development since the 1960s has been
phenomenal. Devastated by the Korean War (1950-1953), South
Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1950s.
Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was a mere $1.5 billion and per
capita GDP was only $70 in 1954. Starting in 1962 with a five-year
economic plan, however, South Korea initiated industrialization to
develop the economy. Through the implementation of several
more five-year economic plans, South Korea now has the 13th largest economy in the world. Its national GDP in 2007 was $949.7
billion and GDP per capita reached $19,624. This rapid development is unprecedented in world history.
Although South Korea enjoyed the miraculous economic development in the past several decades, it also went through political
and economic upheavals during the same time period. After the
assassination of President PARK Chung-hee in 1979, a military dictator who orchestrated South Korea's rapid economic development,
the Korean people were expecting a democratic government. However, that expectation was completely destroyed by another military
dictatorship under CHUN Doo-hwan. To make matters worse, the
Korean economy faced its first potential crisis in 1980 during the
second global oil shock. Although the Chun administration overcame these difficulties, anti-government and political activist moves
for democratization escalated.
In 1987, South Korea held its first direct presidential election in
nearly 30 years. Despite the fact that President ROH Tae-woo, a
hand-picked successor of previous dictator CHUN Doo-whan, was
elected, the event symbolized the transition to democracy. Since
then, civilian leaders have been elected as president and two power
transitions have occurred. The first occurred when the conservative
party lost to the liberal party in two recent presidential terms and
the presidency has since gone back to the conservative party in the
recent election last year.
This democratization has had many positive effects on Korean
politics and society, such as human rights improvement, a better
reflection of public opinion in policymaking, fair elections, as well
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as freedom of speech. Yet, it also had some potentially negative
effects as well. For example, the legalization of labor unions enhanced labor rights but also led to wage hikes, which resulted in
decreased exports. Moreover, frequent labor-management disputes
led to a drastic increase in lost workdays, which contributed to the
outbreak of the financial crisis.
In 1997, South Korea experienced a foreign exchange crisis and
had to be bailed out by the International Money Fund (IMF). Although South Korea graduated from the IMF bailout program
faster than expected, the Korean economy has not been able to get
back to the pace it used to enjoy prior to the crisis. For example,
the South Korean economy is expected to grow in 2008 by 4.9 percent.1 While this expected growth rate is not bad compared to
other countries, the Korean people are used to double-digit growth.
Thus the focus of last presidential election was on getting the economy back on track.
In this paper, we examine the political economy of South Korea to explain the factors that contributed to the miraculous economic development as well as the cause of the financial crisis in
1997 which occurred during the period of transition to democracy.
When South Korea enjoyed high rates of growth, political freedom
was constrained and human rights were abused. However, after the
transition to democracy, the Korean economy struggled and eventually experienced a financial crisis. Thus, we discuss the process of
political and economic development in South Korea to draw lessons
for other countries.
II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE
AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT: THE PARK
CHUNG-HEE ADMINISTRATION
A.

The Statist Approach

Previous studies on South Korea's economic development have
provided a number of theoretical explanations, but one of the most
dominant theoretical frameworks is the government-led development paradigm, so called the statist approach. 2 According to this
I. Moreover, 17 percent of labor population between the age of 15 and 29 is unemployed (OECD, 2007). "Jobs for Youth: Korea,'· Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2007. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/28/
39797189.pdf (viewed on April 23, 2008).
2. Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization,
New York, NW: Oxford University Press. 1992, p.79. Peter Evans. Dietrich Rues·
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approach, state (government) autonomy is a crucial factor in successful economic performance because government is the entity
that designs and implements economic policies. 3 State autonomy is
particularly important when policy shifts occur because new incentives that drive the policy shifts may lead to a new growth coalition
and different winners and losers. 4
Although state autonomy is important, cooperation between
government and dominant social forces, such as chaebol in South
Korea, is also crucial. 5 The reason is that dominant social forces
often seek to affect economic policy-making to have their own interests reflected while the state seeks to reinforce its autonomy to
implement effective industrialization policies. 6 The collaborative
relationship between the government and the private sector, complete with its economic growth, was also needed to offset the lack of
chemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, New York, NW: Cambridge
University Press, 1985, pp. 44-72. Heo, Uk and Sunwoong Kim, "Financial Crisis in
South Korea: Failure of the Government-led Development Paradigm," Asian Survey,
Vol. 40 (2000), pp. 492-507. Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and
the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 24.
3. According to Caporaso and Levine (1992), state autonomy denotes "the ability
of the state to define and pursue an agenda not defined for it solely by private social
interests." J.A. Caporaso and David P. Levine, Theories of Political Economy, New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 181.
4. Stephan Haggard, "Review: The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System," World Politics, Vol. 38 (1986), pp. 343-370.
5. Chaebol refer to gigantic business conglomerates in South Korea. With the government-led development approach, the Seoul government gave a preferential treatment to export-oriented corporations with respect to credit allocation. As a result,
some family owned companies grew to become huge business corporations dealing with
various industries. The close working relationship between the government and the
business community played a significant role in developing the Korean economy. See
Yeon-Ho Lee, The State, Society, and Big Business in South Korea, London: Routledge
Advances in Asia-Pacific Business, 1997, pp. 18-28. However, the close relationship between the government and private sector is often regarded as a source of corruption
and one of the causes of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. See Uk Heo. "South Korea:
Democratization. Financial Crisis, and the Decline of the Developmental State" In
Shale Horowitz and Uk Heo, eds., The political Economy of International Financial
Crisis: Interest Groups, Ideologies, and Institutions, Lanham. MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, pp. 151-164; and Uk Heo and Alexander C. Tan, "Democracy and Economic
Growth in Developing Countries: A Causal Analysis." Comparative Politics, Vol. 33,
No.4 (July 2002), pp.463-473. Neal Jesse, Uk Heo, and Karl DeRouen Jr., "A Nested
Game Approach to Political and Economic Liberalization in Democratizing States: The
Case of South Korea" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September 200),
pp. 401-422.
6. Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon. "Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and A Korean Case,'' World Politics, Vol. 42 (1990): pp. 210-237.
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political legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes. The Governm~nt
maintained stability through its economic success and by shanng
the benefits of their newfound economic success with the dominant
social and economic forces. 7 Thus, Peter Evans asserts that government had to be "embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds
the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the
continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies." 8
B.

Export-Oriented Industrialization

Although the South Korean government actively intervened in
the economy to protect domestic industries, their intervention was
also designed to lead the economy to be competitive in international markets. 9 Thus, White and Wade argue that the ultimate objective of the Korean government was liberalizing the economy to
be able to compete in international markets. 10 This direction was
manifested in the export-oriented industrialization strategy pursued
by the government.
In 1962, the Korean government launched the first five-year
economic plan. As U.S. aid was declining, the plan focused on
transforming the economy from being foreign aid dependent to becoming independent. To this end, the government provided assistance to basic industries and invested in the improvement of social
and economic infrastructure, which was critical for economic development. In other words, with the first five-year economic plan, the
government aimed to improve the foundation of the economy
before the initiation of export-oriented industrialization policy.
After the first economic development plan was completed in
1967, increasing exports became the keynote of the second five-year
development plan. 11 The government planned on fostering industries for both export promotion and import-substitution, although
7. Danny M.Leipziger, Lessons from East Asia, Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 1997, p. 235.
8. Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1995, p. 12.
9. According to Lee (1985), the open economy system took root through the second development plan structurally. Jung-Bock Lee, "Industrialization and the Changes
of Political System," Han-gook-jung-chi-hock-hoi (The Korean Political Science Association), Vol. 19 (1985), pp. 61-75.
10. Gorden White and Robert Wade, "Development; States and Markets in East
Asia: An Introduction," in Gorden White, ed., Developmental States in East Asia, New
York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1988, p. 182.
11. Ho-Jin Kim, Han-gook-jung-chi Che-ju-ron (The Theory of Korean Politics),
Seoul: Park-Young Sa, 1990, p. 135.
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import-substitution was designed mainly to support the material
supply required for manufacturing exporting goods. Due to the
lack of capital and advanced technology, the government initially
promoted labor-intensive light industries for export. As the economy grew with the increase in exports, the government gradually
moved its focus from light industries to heavy-chemical industries.
The export-oriented industrialization policy had two meaningful effects. First, import substitution of light industrial goods was
almost completed by the end of the 1960s, and the quality of the
products had reached international standards_IZ Second, exportoriented industrialization had a significant impact on the industrial
structure. Prior to the policy, primary industry, especially agriculture, was the major industry in Korea. For example, the agriculture
industry accounted for between 40-50 percent of the total industrial
structure in Korea until the early 1960's. The second industry, such
as manufacturing, made up mere 10-20 percent. However, by the
late 1960's, both types of industries had balanced out, and each of
them accounted for approximately 30 percent of the industrial
structure.
Starting in the early 1970's, the government started pushing for
Heavy Chemical Industrialization (HCI). With the 3rd five-year economic development plan (1972-1976), the government appointed
nonferrous metals, petrochemicals, general-type machinery, shipbuilding, and electronics as five strategic fields. Since HCI was expensive and risky, the dependency of business on the government
for credit allocation increased. As a result, the government-business ties deepened.
C.

Control of the Financial Sector and the GovernmentBusiness Ties

To implement the export-oriented growth policy, the Korean
government made two policy moves: 1) control the financial sector
to provide preferential treatment of export-oriented industries and
to increase domestic savings; and 2) manage the exchange rate to
stabilize exports. To this end, the Korean government purchased
bank stocks and publicly owned the main banks, which provided
two benefits: 1) it buttressed the state autonomy; and 2) gave it
power over credit allocation. To fully exercise its power of credit
allocation, in September 1965, the government announced a law
12. Bohn-Ho Koo, Han-gook-gyung-je-ui Yeok-sa-jeok Jo-Myung (The Historical
Approach on Korean Economy), Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1991, p. 188.
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that limited interest rates. According to Haggard, Kim, and Moon,
this reform policy was one of the locomotives that contributed to
South Korea's economic growth.U With this policy, the Korean
government aimed to move a significant amount of capital from the
private money market to banks by controlling the unrealistic interest rates of the private money market and then raising the interest
rates of savings account. In addition, the government intended to
increase domestic savings to create an important source of domestic
investment. The policy worked and savings rates consistently increased over time. For instance, in the 1960s the average personal
savings share of GDP was only 1 to 2 percent, but by the 1970's it
had increased to 7 percent. 14
In addition, the Korean government aggressively managed the
exchange rate to maintain the value of the Korean currency, won,
without much fluctuation. The won was kept devaluated to promote exports. Some scholars point out that the effect of exchange
rate management was limited due to the large proportion of imports of raw materials or was irrelevant because of heavy subsidies
and coerciveness on exports. 15 However, a deliberately maintained
realistic exchange rate "provided an incentive to export and sustained the price stability of imported materials." 16
III.

ANOTHER AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT: THE
CHUN DOO-WHAN ADMINISTRATION

On October 26, 1979, President PARK Chung-hee was assassinated by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) director,
KIM Jae-kyu. The death of President Park brought about confusion and instability due to the power vacuum caused by the elimination of an absolute ruler that had governed the country for nearly
two decades. Against the Korean people's hope to have a democratic government, Major General CHUN Doo-whan came to
power. Thousands of people went out to the streets to protest
against the Chun government. On May 18, 1980 in Kwangju, there
was a massive demonstration by college students and private citi13. Stephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim, and Chung-In Moon, "The Transition to
Export•led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 50
(1991), pp. 850-873.
14. Leipziger, Lessons from East Asia, supra note 4, p. 169.
15. Amsden. Asia's Next Giant, supra note 3, pp. 65-67.
1?. Su?g Deuk Hahm ~nd Uk H.eo, "The Economic Effects of US and Japanese
Fore1gn D1rect Investment m East As1a: A Comparative Analysis," Policy Studies Journal, Vol.36 (2008):
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zens asking for democracy. The government sent troops and suppressed the protest by force, which resulted in approximately 200
deaths and 800 injuries. As a result, the CHUN Doo-whan government constantly faced anti-government protests despite the fact
that he was elected president by the electoral college in 1981.
Before the election, a constitutional amendment passed which limited the presidential term as a non-renewable, single term of 7
years.
As soon as President Chun took office, his administration
faced a number of serious economic problems. Due to the second
oil shock in 1979, inflation was high and was threatening the economy. The policy efforts by the previous government to reduce inflation were not successful due to the intense investment in the
heavy chemical industry (HCI). The economic structure was based
on big business conglomerates (chaebol), which was causing
problems in the economic structural as well as an unequal distribution of wealth. To make matters worse, the international economic
environment was not friendly to Korean exports either. The second
oil shock brought on an international recession, which gave rise to
protectionism in many countries. To confront with these problems,
the Chun administration adopted aggressive policy measures to
continue to develop the economy in order to compensate for the
lack of political legitimacy. We explain each of them next.

A.

Inflation Control

Since the PARK Chung-hee administration mainly focused on
growth, there were inflation pressures. In the late 1970s, inflation
reached a dangerous level due to the second oil shock and the
heavy and chemical industrial drive. Although the Park Administration recognized the seriousness of inflation, their policy response, such as the 4.17 Policies for Stability, 17 was not limited
because Park did not want to slow down growth or the HCI drive.
17. The Policies for Economic Stability, also called the 4. 17 Policies, which were
announced on April17, were first implemented in 1979 under the Park Administration.
These policies mainly consist of seven parts: first, currency management; second, reducing the fiscal deficit; third, liberalizing imports; fourth, reforming the price system according to market economy; fifth, stabilizing wages: sixth, controlling investments in
HCI: seventh, stabilizing the price of real estate (Lee 2003). Hyung-Goo Lee. Jo-se Jejung-jung-check 0-sheep-nyun Jeung-un mit Jung-check Pyung-ga (The Record and
Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policies for 50 years), Seoul: Korean Institute of Public
Finance. 2003, p. 52.
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The Chun Administration, however, was different. The government placed emphasis on reducing inflation to acquire socio-economic stability. In addition, the Chun government realized that
continued inflation might reduce South Korea's international competitiveness, which would slow down exports and, eventually,
growth. Thus, controlling inflation became one of the main policy
objectives of the Chun Administration. 18 To combat it, the government adopted a tight fiscal policy, such as a government expenditure freeze in 1984, raising interest rates, and reducing credit. 19 The
budget deficit was also reduced by 39 percent by 1985.20 A report
by the Bank of Korea describes the period of the Chun administration as "a period of stability of prices."
B.

Economic Restructuring

In addition to inflation control efforts, the Chun administration
attempted to overhaul the economic structure to enhance stability.
To this end, the Chun government tried to reduce the dependence
of the economy on big business conglomerates (chaebol) and heavy
chemical industries with the Policies for Restraining Economic Centralization in 1980. This policy was meaningful because its approach was to restructure the existing Korean economy. After this
policy was adopted, the government stepped up its efforts to distribute more resources to medium and small size enterprises.
Another policy effort by the Chun administration was "rearranging businesses" to improve the overall effectiveness of the national economy. Due to the government-led development
approach, some industries, such as shipping and construction heavily relied on the government in the 1970s.Z1 Although these businesses were supported by the government through investment and
favorable tax policies, they failed to overcome the hurdles
presented to them by the new international economic environments
in the 1980s. These included a global recession, increased protectionism in developed countries, and international pressures for Ko18. Jung-Gil Chung, Dae-Tong-Ryung-ui Kyung-je Leadership (President's Economic Leadership). Seoul: The Korea Economic Daily. 1994, p. 146.
19. Staphan Haggard and Chung-In Moon. "Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and A Korean Case," World Politics, Vol. 42 (1990), pp. 210-237.
20. Ibid., Haggard and Moon (1990) also pointed out that the effort for fiscal restraint was particularly impressive. since the average annual growth rates of government spending between 1962 and 1979 had been 28 percent. p. 222.
21. Korean Economic Research Institute. Han-guk-ui Gee-eup-jeep-dan (Korean
Kombinat). Korean Economic Research Institute, 2005, p. 212.
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rea to revalue their currency. The government, therefore, selected
unprofitable businesses and liquidated them through acquisition (50
companies), merger (17 companies), and legal management (1 company). Until 1988, the number of those reorganized businesses had
reached 70. 22
In addition, the Chun Administration avoided direct government intervention in the economy by cutting down or removing tax
policies designed to support specific export-oriented industries. Instead, the government put more emphasis on improving business
environment and economic infrastructures.
The Chun government also changed the credit allocation policies by introducing a cap on credit that can be assigned to one
chaebol. The new policy also required a government's approval
before a chaebol invested in a new business. This measure was to
help correct the unfair relationship between big firms and small
businesses. 23
C.

Effects of New Economic Policies

Policies adopted by the Chun administration to control inflation worked. Moreover, with the changed role of the government
in credit allocation and the economy in general, the Korean economy got back on the track and resumed its rapid growth. The average growth rate during the Chun Administration (1981-1987) was
8.7 percent and the national GDP reached $100 billion. Considering
that the growth rate of 1980 was -1.5 percent, the new policies to
deal with economic problems worked effectively. As Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol pointed out, some economic policy measures adopted by the Chun administration were only possible
because of its strong autonomy of the state. 24 Also, it should be
noted that the "three lows" in economic conditions-low oil prices,
low interest rates, and low exchange rates-provided a friendly environment for economic recovery and growth. In summary, the

22. Hun-Joo Park, "The Perspective of Small Business in South Korea.'· Korean
Development Institute (KDI) School Working Paper Series 06 (13). 2006, p. 25.
23. Yeon-Ho Lee, The State, Society, and Big Business in South Korea, London:
Routledge Advances in Asia-Pacific Business, 1997, pp. 46-53.
24. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State
Back In, New York, NW: Cambridge University Press, 1985. p.l75.
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Chun government's new economic policies gave way to other economic take-offs in the 1980s and a more liberalized economy.Z5

IV. DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
A.

The Transition to Democracy

Although the Chun administration was successful in bringing
the economy back around, protests for democracy increased due to
the administration's human rights abuse and authoritarian rule.
The movement peaked at the accidental death of a college student,
PARK Jong-chul, which was caused by a police beating. Thousands
of people came out to the street to protest against the Chun government and to request a direct election for the next president. On
June 29, 1987, the government made an announcement to give way
to the transition to democracy, which included: 1) a direct election
of the president; 2) a guarantee of human rights; 3) guarantees of
freedom of speech; 4) local autonomy; and 5) securing freedom of
political parties. 26 With 93 percent support for the direct presidential election in a referendum, the constitutional amendment to
change the presidential election process was promulgated on October 29, 1987. 27
The June 29 announcement also included the pardon of KIM
Dae-Jung, a life-long opposition leader, which enabled him to join
the presidential race in 1987. KIM Young-Sam, a political rival of
KIM Dae-Jung, was also determined to run for presidency. 28 Since
the running of both candidates would split the votes and reduce the
chance for electing a civilian president, the two Kims-KIM Daejung and KIM Young-sam-attempted to have a single candidate,
but failed. As a result, the direct presidential election resulted in
the victory by the governing party's candidate, ROH Tae-woo with
25. Dahl-Joong Chang. "Kyung-je-sung-jang-gwa jung-chi-byun-dong (Economic
Growth and Political Transition)." In Korean Politics-Issues and Tasks, ed. The Korean
Political Science Association. Seoul: Bobmunsa, 1993, p. 80.
26. Hyun-Sheup Kim, Witaehan chokuk Konsolae pijanghan kakoh (The grim
promise to build the great father land), Kyunghyang sinmun, June 29, 1987, p. 3.
27. Larry Diamond and Doh-chull Shin, "Institutional Reform and Democratic
Consolidation in Korea," Larry Diamond and Doh-chull Shin ed .. Institutional Reform
and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press
2000, p.6.
'
28. John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999,
pp. 98-101.
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36.6 percent of votes while KIM Young-Sam and KIM Dae-Jung
received 28 and 27.1 percent respectively.Z 9
Despite the fact that President ROH Tae-woo was elected
through the popular election, his administration's legitimacy was
still questioned because of his military background and the support
provided by the previous authoritarian leader, CHUN Doo-whan.
Moreover, the National Assembly's audit found serious evidence of
corruption by President CHUN Doo-whan and the opposition party
pressured to indict him. Thus, the Roh administration attempted to
separate itself from the legacy of Chun's authoritarian regime, however it was without much success.
Due to President Rob's unpopularity, the opposition party enjoyed the majority in the National Assembly, which caused difficulties for the new administration to pass policy resolutions. To
correct the situation, President Rob approached the two opposition
leaders, KIM Young-sam, and KIM Jong-pil, which resulted in a
three party merger on Jan 22, 1990. The party merger helped not
only the ROH Tae-woo administration to pass policy resolutions in
the National Assembly but it also helped KIM Young-sam to become the governing party's candidate in the next presidential
election.
On December 18, 1992, KIM Young-sam was elected to become the first civilian president selected through a direct election.
To have complete control over the military, President KIM Youngsam purged the members of the Hanahoe, an inner circle organization with specific political orientation which was secretly organized
by CHUN Doo-hwan in 1963. The Hanahoe members enjoyed
domination in key military positions and entered into politics once
General CHUN became president. To politically neutralize the
military, President Kim retired all the Hanahoe members from the
military.
President KIM Young-sam also reopened the corruption case
of Presidents CHUN Doo-whan and ROH Tae-woo by declaring
the "judgment of history" on June 3, 1993. CHUN Doo-whan was
sentenced to life in prison and ROH Tae-woo was sentenced seventeen years in prison for the military coup on December 12, 1979, the
brutal suppression of the Kwangju uprising on May 18, 1980, and
embezzlement.
29. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The political economy of democratic
transitions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p95.
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The KIM Young-sam administration also adopted local aut?nomy to further democratize the political system. With the adoptiOn
of local autonomy, the KIM Young-sam administration reduced t~e
central government's involvement in local policy making. Thts
change made significant contributions to democracy in South
Korea.

V. ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE UNDER DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
A. The ROH Tae-woo Administration
The ROH Tae-woo administration's emphasis on equity and
balance enhanced the social welfare system through housing policies and a national health care plan. 30 To supply more homes, the
government adopted a policy to construct two million new housing
units. To this end, an annual average of two hundred thousand
homes were built. The national health plan adopted by the PARK
Chung-hee administration was also expanded to include people in
the lower income brackets and the minimum wage law was adopted
to assist in the redistribution of wealth.
However, the public investment to improve social welfare aggravated the balance of payments. To make matters worse, the
trade deficit caused by a surge in imports led to an economic decline. In addition, the number of labor unions and labor-management disputes increased significantly. For example, the number of
labor unions rose by 19.5 percent in 1988 followed by 19.8 percent
in 1989. 31 Labor unions organized strikes to raise wages when labor-management disputes occurred. The ROH Tae-woo administration, however, decided not to intervene, which led to the
increases in lost worker productivity especially in the early period
of the Roh administration (1987-1989).
The frequent strikes eventually led to wage increases for labor
workers. The average income of labor workers grew by 10 percent
in 1987, 15.5 percent in 1988, and 21.1 percent in 1989. The rapid
income growth resulted in higher rates of inflation, a loss of interna30. Seong-Ryeul Cho, "Economic Reform and National Strategic Change of the
Roh Tae-woo administration," Hankuk jungchi hakhaebo (Korea Political Science Association Review), Vol. 30, No. 2 (1996), p 196.
31. Seong-Jae Cho and Jung-Woo Kim, Hankukui nosakwan'gye byonhwa ch'uyi
bunsok mit saeroun nosachongch'aek panghyang (The analysis of the relation between
labor and manager and new direction of labor and manager policy), Gwach'on: Ministry
of Labor, 2007, p. 33.
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tional competitiveness, and slower economic growth. For example,
between 1987 and 1989, the average wage of labor workers in South
Korea went up by 46.6 percent whereas it increased by only 0.1 percent and 9.8 percent in the U.S. and Japan respectively. This difference in wage increases significantly reduced South Korea's
international competitiveness. 32 As a result, Korea's economic
growth rate dropped to 6.4 percent in 1989 from 11.5 percent in the
previous year. Given that the average growth rate for 1985-1990
was 14.4 percent, this was a significant decline in economic growth.
Thus, President Roh vetoed a labor reform bill in 1989 that favored
labor unions. However, the labor sector continued to put pressure
on the Roh government especially after South Korea joined the
United Nations on September 19, 1991 and the International Labor
organization on December 9, 1991.33
Table 1. Labor-management Dispute Status
Years

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Labor Dispute
Figures (cases)

3,749

1,873

1,616

322

234

235

144

Days not worked
by economic
6946935 5400836 6351400 4487200 3257600 1527600 130830(
activity
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO), LABORSTA- database of labour statistics
(http://laborsta.ilo.org/).
Ministry of labor of South Korea, Hankukai nosakwan'gye by6nhwa ch'uvi buns6k mit saeroun nosach6ngch'aek panghyang (The analysis of the relation between labor and manager and
new direction of labor and manager policy), Gwach'on: Ministry of Labor, 2007, pp. 18-19.

Table 2. Income Growth Rates
Years
Wage Growth(%)

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
9.2

8.2

10.1 15.5 21.1 18.8 17.5 15.2 12.2

12.7

Source: Ministry of Labor, Maew61 nodong t'onggye chosa bogos6 (labor statistics monthly
report), from 1985 to 1994.

32. Won-dok Lee,J987nyon ihu hankukui nodong undong (Labor Movement in Korea after 1987), Seoul: Korea Labor Institute, 2000, p. 15.
33. Young-ki Choi, Gwang-seuk Jeon, and Cheul-su Lee, Bum-sang Ryu, 87nyon
ihu nodongbOpjeiii byonch'onyon: bOpchejong mit chOngch'aek byonhwaiii yiJksa (The

changes of labor law after'S?: the history of law establishment and policy change),
Gwacheon: Ministry of Labor, 1999, pp. 79-132.
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Table 3. Inflation
Years

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Inflation(%)

3.07

7.14

5.68

8.56

9.34

6.23

4.79

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world Economic Outlook(WEO) Database
April 1999, Inflation
(http://www .imf.org/externaUpu bs/ft/weo/ 1999/01 Idata/index.h tm)

B. The KIM Young-sam Administration
The KIM Young-sam administration began liberalizing the
economy through deregulation and a decrease in government intervention. The Kim administration decided not to investigate rampant corruption coming from the financial institution's lending
practice. Traditionally, there was a close tie between politicians,
government officials, and businessman. Politicians/government officials pressured banks to give loans to export oriented businesses,
especially chaebol, and chaebol made illegal campaign contributions
to politicians in return.
To cut the politics-business ties and make financial transactions
transparent, the KIM Young-sam administration adopted the realname financial transaction policy. Prior to the adoption of the policy, the South Korean government implicitly admitted false name
financial transactions to increase savings and money circulation.
However, false name accounts were commonly used to avoid capital gain taxes as well as in money laundering schemes.
Another policy adopted by the Kim administration related to
the real-name financial transaction system was the real-name property ownership. The implementation of the policy started with the
financial disclosure of high-ranking public officials. This initial step
was meaningful because the use of false names for real estate ownership was common. This alias or borrowing of another person's
name was commonly used to avoid capital gain taxes for sales or
inheritance of real estate properties.
In addition, to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the KIM Young-sam administration pushed economic policies, which included the liberalization of
the foreign exchange rate, foreign direct investment, and insurance.
These policies led to an increase in foreign capital flow, which was
followed by the rise of mercantile banks or quasi-financial companies to handle the foreign capital. However, these new financial
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institutions lacked experience in dealing with foreign capital which
was partially to blame for the cause of the financial crisis in 1997.34
The Kim administration also introduced a labor reform bill to
change the labor-management relationship. The bill included three
important changes: 1) legalization of layoffs by the management; 2)
flexible work hours; and 3) laborer reform to improve the efficiency
of the labor structure.3 5 The bill faced strong opposition and stalled
in the National Assembly.
C. The 1997 Financial Crisis
Starting in the mid-1990s, South Korea showed signs of economic trouble. By June 1997, foreign debt by Korean banks had
reached 24 percent of the gross national product. What made the
debt even riskier was the amount of short-term debt, which was
approximately 350 percent of their foreign exchange reserves.
Moreover, the average debt-equity ratio of the thirty largest business conglomerates (chaebol) was almost 400 percent. Considering
that the average debt-equity ratio of large U.S. firms is a mere 70
percent, the financial structure of the Korean chaebol was seriously
problematic. 36
What led to the rather sudden rise of international debt? According to Demetriades and Fattouh,37 "[F]inancial liberalization
and tight monetary policy, which kept domestic interest rates above
world interest rates, encouraged commercial and merchant banks to
rely heavily on cheaper foreign credit-perceived to be cheaper because of the pegged exchange rate." Since there was no prudential
supervision system over international lending practices, short-term
borrowing was enhanced.
The high rates of short-term loans and international debt along
with the low level of political involvement and economic control did
not allow the Kim administration to make proper adjustment
before the financial problems became uncontrollable, which eventually led to a serious foreign exchange problem. Exchange rates
34. Jung Kim, "The political logic of economic crisis in South Korea," Asian Survey,
VoL 45, No. 3 (2005), pp. 468-469.
35. Song-tokYom, Nosa daerip sae bulssi I chongni haeko diing 3jae nollan (the
tinderbox of antagonism between labor and manager), Kukmin llbo, July 3, 1996, p. 3.
36. Henry Laurence, "Financial system reform and the currency crisis in East Asia,"
Asian Survey, VoL 39, No. 2 (March-April 1999), p. 363.
37. Panicos 0. Demetriades and Bassam A. Fattouh, "The South Korean financial
crisis: Competing explanations and policy lessons for financial liberalization," International Affairs. VoL 75, No. 4 (October 1999), p.788.
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skyrocketed in the second half of the year, and the administration
had to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to bail it out
from default. What caused the financial crisis in South Korea in
1997? There are many reasons, but one of them may be found in
immature institutionalization of political and economic organizations which still had the legacy of the government-led development
paradigm. During the authoritarian leadership under the statist approach, the government allocated credit to private business companies, which led to close ties between the government and private
business companies. As a result, bribery and kickbacks were common between the government and private business companies,
which made transparent lending practice virtually impossible. Although some improvements were made thanks to the transition to
democracy, there still was corruption in lending practice.
Moreover, international competitiveness declined as the price
of exporting Korean goods rose significantly. Since labor unions
were legalized after the transition to democracy, the labor-management disputes often led to labor strikes, which reduced productivity
and worsened the financial structure of the business companies.
The management of private business companies, however, was not
able to lay off labor workers due to labor unions. Thus, the Kim
administration attempted to address these issues through a labor
reform bill and a financial reform bill. However the bills stalled in
the National Assembly due to the president's lame duck status and
the incorporation of the opposition parties.
D.

The KIM Dae-jung Administration: Post Crisis Reform
Policies

Although President KIM Dae-jung won the presidential election by a 1.6 percent margin, the KIM Dae-Jung administration was
in a better position to implement labor and financial reform than
the KIM Young-sam administration. Moreover, the policy prescription by the IMF strongly recommended the Kim government
restructure chaebol and ill-performing financial institutions. 38 Thus,
the Kim government privatized most publicly owned banks. In addition, the government attracted foreign capital to save struggling
companies.
The IMF recommended high rates of interest and tax increases
along with cutbacks on government expenditures. Following the
38. Tong Whan Park, "South Korea in 1997: Clearing the last hurdle to politicaleconomic maturation,'' Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1997). pp. 2-4.

18

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

IMP's policy prescription, the Kim government significantly raised
interest rates, which made credit allocation extremely difficult for
small and medium size enterprises. As a result, a number of companies went bankrupt and unemployment rates rose significantly.
Thus, this policy recommendation by the IMF was severely
criticized. 39
Turning to the financial sector reforms, the IMF emphasized
that reform policies must be based on economic logic and not political considerations. Moreover, the IMF strongly encouraged the Seoul government to further liberalize their markets. 40 To meet the
IMF expectations, first the KIM Dae-jung administration attempted
to improve the institutionalization of financial transactions. To this
end, the Kim government created two financial supervisory authorities: the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service. 41 These institutions monitored banks' BIS (Bank
for International Settlements) ratio and their adherence to international standards. In addition, the Kim government abolished the
cap of aggregate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of Korean equities to attract more foreign direct investment. 42
Turning to corporate reform, the KIM Dae-jung government
adopted the approach called "big deals. " 43 Through this approach
chaebol swapped weak businesses to merge into strong companies.
When the big deal was not possible, a new company was created
through combining the weakest businesses from chaebol. For in39. Panicos 0. Demetriades and Bassam A. Fattouh, "The South Korean financial
crisis: Competing explanations and policy lessons for financial liberalization," International Affairs. Vol. 75, No.4 (October 1999), p.791; David A. Zalewski, "Brothers, Can
you Spare $58 Billion? Regulatory Lessons from the South Korean Currency Crisis,"
Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.33, No. 2 (June 1999), p. 359.
40. Henry Laurence, "Financial system reform and the currency crisis in East Asia,''
Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2 (March-April 1999), pp. 365-366.
41. Kyng Suh Park, "Bank-led Corporate Restructuring." In Stephen Haggard,
Wonhyuk Lim, and Euysung Kim ed., Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in
Korea. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 181; Jin-Wook Choi, "Regulatory forbearance and Financial Crisis in south Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 2
(March-April 2002), p. 270.
42. Jae S. Mah, "Regulatory Lessons from the South Korean Currency Crisis: Comment on Zalewski." Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 2002), p.
797; Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo, "South Korea's Experience with structural Reform:
Lessons for other countries," Korean Social Science Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 (June 2006),
p.11.
43. Kyng Suh Park, "Bank-led Corporate Restructuring." In Stephen Haggard,
Wonhyuk Lim, and Euysung Kim ed., Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in
Korea. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 181-206.
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stance, Kia Motors was bought out by Hyundai Motors and Samsung Motors was sold to Renault. Hyundai took over
Semiconductor part of LG, and power components of Samsung
Heavy Industries and Hyundai Industries were annexed by the Korea Heavy Industries and Construction (Hanjung). 44
To enhance the transparency of the accounting practices of
chaebol, the government passed the Act on External Audit of Stock
Companies that mandated them to submit annual financial reports.45 Moreover, the government required that chaebol be subject to audits by a credible international accounting firm twice a
year.46
Finally, to make the labor market more flexible, as the IMF
suggested, the KIM Dae-Jung administration legalized layoffs for
necessary management. Yet, the law led to increases in the high
rates of unemployment and brought forth the specter of more labor-management dispute. Therefore, the government launched the
Tripartite Commission of Labor, Business and Government in 1999
to deal with the layoff related problems. 47
Another issue with the labor reform was increasing irregular
(non-union) workers. Since the irregular workers could not join a
labor union and did not have a guarantee of working hours nor
benefits, the business management preferred increasing the number
of irregular workers than regular employees. The high portion of
irregular workers continues to be a social issue and often used as an
excuse for labor strikes.

44. Yoo, Seong Min, Chaebol, gwayeon wigiii jubiJminga? (Are the Chaebol in the
Real Culprits of the Economic Crisis?) Seoul: Korea Development Institute, Bibong
Press, 2000, pp.1-182; Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo, "South Korea's Experience with
structural Reform: Lessons for other countries," Korean Social Science Journal, Vol. 33,
No. 1 (June 2006), p.12.
45. Jongryn Moand Chung-In Moon, "Business-Government Relations under Kim
Dae-jung." In Stephen Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim. and Euysung Kim ed., Economic Crisis
and Corporate Restructuring in Korea, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.
129; Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo, "South Korea's Experience with structural Reform:
Lessons for other countries," Korean Social Science Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 (June 2006),
p.12.
46. Henry Laurence, "Financial system reform and the currency crisis in East Asia,''
Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2 (March-April 1999), p. 365.
47. Florence Lowe-Lee. "Labor flexibility, a key to economic success," Korea Insight, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2006 (http://www.keia.com/Publications/Insight/
2006/september% 2006. pdf)
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E. The ROH Moo-hyun Administration
ROH Moo-hyun was the fourth civilian president since South
Korea's transition to democracy. He was unexpectedly elected and
thereby a different kind of president. The two previous civilian
presents-KIM Young-sam and KIM Dae-jung-had been life-long
opposition leaders with strong support from specific regions. They
both had been democracy activists. However, President ROH
Moo-hyun had none of these qualifications. Thus, President Roh
was constrained only by the boundary of constitutional rights and
did not try to control other political institutions. 48
In terms of economic performance, the South Korean economy
recovered from the 1997 financial crisis and graduated from the
IMF bailout program earlier than expected. Learning from the experience, the Korean government significantly increased its foreign
exchange reserve from $20.4 billion in 1997 to $206.1 billion in 2006,
the fifth highest in the world. 49
Despite the quick recovery from the crisis, the economy also
revealed potential problems due to the policies adopted to stimulate the economy during the KIM Dae-jung administration. One of
the main problems was credit card debt. To enhance private consumption to bolster the economy, the KIM Dae-jung administration
strongly encouraged credit card usage. This policy helped the economy grow in the short-term, but the consequences came later because the much of the growth was largely based on debt. The over
usage of credit cards resulted in more than 3.2 million Koreans with
bad credit ratings, which in turn led to a decrease in private consumption in 2003 and 2004. 50 In other words, the KIM Dae-jung
administration's campaign to increase private consumption based
on credit card was myopic. The reason for the adoption of this kind
of short-sighted policy may be found in South Korea's presidential
48. Sung Deuk Hahm and Dong Seong Lee, "Consolidation of Democracy in South
Korea: Evaluation of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, 2003-2008." Presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 2007, Chicago, Aug 30Sep 2, pp. 7-10.
49. Mun-il Bak, "Jipyoro bon Oehanwigi 10nyon" (Economic indexes of 10 years
after foreign exchange crisis), Seoul Sinmun, November 21, 2007, p.l8.
50. Sung Deuk Hahm and Dong Seong Lee, "Consolidation of Democracy in South
Korea: Evaluation of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, 2003-2008." Presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 2007, Chicago, Aug 30Sep 2, p. 17; Byoung-Jik Kim, "Roh moo hyun jongbu ch'orahan kyongje songjokpyo"
(Roh moo hyun administration's poor economic records), Munhwa llbo, January 29,
2007, p.5.
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system with its non-renewable, single-term for five years. Since the
president cannot run for another term, political accountability becomes insignificant. Thus, presidents tend to adopt policies good
for the short-term, leaving the following president to pay the price.
Another economic issue that the Roh administration faced was
reduced corporate investment. With the raised labor cost and the
aggressive strikes by labor unions, business corporations increased
foreign investment at the expense of declined domestic investment.
According to Samsung Economic research Institute, the average
annual growth rate of corporate investment for equipment was 7.8
percent for 1990-1997, but it declined to 1.15 percent for 20002005.51

These issues resulted in sluggish economic performance. The
average annual economic growth rate during the CHUN Doo-whan
administration was 8.7 percent. During the ROH Tae-woo administration, it was 8.4 percent, and it was 7.1 percent during the KIM
Young-sam administration. However, the average annual economic
growth rate for the KIM Dae-jung and ROH Moo-hyun administrations was only 4.4 percent and 4.2 percent respectively. 52 Moreover, between 2002 and 2006, the portion of the population living in
poverty increased by 12 percent. 53 Despite that, the Roh administration significantly increased social welfare expenditures. For example, only 17.9 percent of government expenditures were
allocated for social welfare in 1997, but that was increased to 25.3
percent in 2006. 54
In summary, the Roh administration had to deal with the results of the myopic policies adopted by the KIM Dae-jung administration to quickly recover from the financial crisis. To make
matters worse, the Roh administration increased social welfare expenditures by increasing taxes to improve social wealth redistribution. As a result, corporate capital moved to foreign countries
looking for better business environments, which in turn slowed the
51. Yoo-young Kim, "Oehanwigi 10nyon, Kumnyung- kiop, odiinkotgwa Iriinkot"
(10 years after foreign exchange crisis, what we lost and got in finance and businesses),
Donga Ilbo, November 15, p.lO.
52. Byoung-Jik Kim, "Roh moo hyun jongbu ch'orahan kyongje songjokpyo" (Roh
moo hyun administration's poor economic records), Munhwa /lbo, January 29, 2007,
p.5.
53. Sung Deuk Hahm and Dong Seong Lee, "Consolidation of Democracy in South
Korea: Evaluation of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, 2003-2008." Presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 2007, Chicago, Aug 30 _
Sep 2, p. 17
54. Ibid., footnote 26, p. 17.
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economy. Aggressive labor unions further aggravated economic
performance.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

South Korea's miraculous economic development along with
that of a few other East Asian countries generated theoretical debates in the political science and economics communities. The debate largely focused on the government-led development paradigm
vs. market-oriented paradigm. The debate generally concluded that
the role of government in South Korea was critical along with the
value of human capital. To describe the role of government in
South Korea's economic development, we revisited the development process and described economic policies adopted by the
government.
In addition, we also analyzed how the transition to democracy
in South Korea occurred and why democratization may affect economic performance. As Huntington noted, 55 South Korea experienced two power transitions and a deepening of democracy.
Unlike the expectation of scholars who argue that democracy helps
economic growth, 56the initial economic performance of democratic
governments in South Korea was rather poor.
There could be three reasons for economic success by the authoritarian regime and the rather poor performance by the democratic government. First, the authoritarian government was able
to keep labor costs low to make Korean products competitive in
international markets. Moreover, former military leaders (e.g.
PARK Chung-hee, CHUN Doo-whan, and ROH Tae-woo) employed technocrats to develop the economy. With the strong support of the leaders, technocrats designed policies to develop the
economy. However, civilian leaders (e.g KIM Young-sam, KIM
Dae-jung, and ROH Moo-hyun) largely appointed their political allies and supporters to government posts. They used authorities to
appoint cabinet posts to payback their political debt. Thus, political
55. Samuel S. Huntington, The Third wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 267.
56. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The
Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review, Vol.88 (1994), pp.
903-910; Yi Feng, "Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27 (1997), pp. 391-418; Mancur Olson. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,'' American Political Science Review, Vol. 87 (1993), pp.
567-576.
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connections played a key role in their cabinet appointment, which
often led to a problematic policy making.
A second reason can be found in the presidential system installed after the transition to democracy, which does not allow the
president to rerun for another term. Since the president does not
have to worry about the next term, shortsighted policies tend to be
adopted as long as they are good for the short-term. A great example of this practice is the KIM Dae-jung administration's campaign
to increase credit card usage to promote private consumption to
stimulate the economy. It helped the Korean economy to recover
from the 1997 financial crisis, but credit card debt became a serious
social problem during the ROH Moo-hyun administration period.
This problem tends to appear in every presidential system regardless of term limits.
Third and finally, civilian presidents, particularly Presidents
KIM Dae-jung and ROH Moo-hyun adopted pro-labor policies and
increased social welfare expenditures through tax increase. The objective of these policies were to reduce the gap between the rich
and the poor, but the outcome of the policies was the departure of
corporate capital to foreign countries and an aggravation of the
wealth gap due to increased unemployment. In other words, the
redistribution-oriented policies not only hindered growth, but also
aggravated the wealth inequity between classes.
The experience of South Korea's political and economic development summarized above, has important policy implications and
provides lessons for other developing countries. It is common in
newly democratized countries for the government to adopt policies
emphasizing wealth redistribution in attempts to attract more support from the poorer classes. As in the South Korean case, however, redistribution-oriented economic policies tend to yield
economic struggles, at least in the short-term. Thus, newly elected
democratic leaders need to be cautious in their policy decisions.
Another lesson drawn from the South Korean example is that
the transition to democracy does not result in immediate economic
growth. Instead, democratization requires consolidation, which involves institutionalization of the political and economic systems. In
the process, previously dispersed interest groups as well as organized groups begin to aggregate and articulate their interest, which
sometimes creates political instability. Thus, the rate at which democratic and economic systems institutionalize is of critical impor-
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tance for economic performance after democratization because the
maturity of institutions will play a critical role in policy making and
implementation.

